Draft FSA Report Card Evaluation of the Key Elements of the Final Settlement Agreement on First Nations Child and Family Services
Press Release
| Draft FSA | Grade | Comment |
| Security of Funding Across | D | Current Canadian Human Rights Tribunal (Tribunal) orders provide approximately $4.5 billion |
| Government Changes | per year plus orders on actuals for expenses like capital. Orders do not expire, they only end | |
| if another order replaces them. The current orders (status quo) provide better protection | ||
| for the funding than the draft Final Settlement Agreement (FSA), which allows Parliament | ||
| to vote on funding levels every year. If the draft FSA is not approved by First Nations and/or | ||
| the Tribunal, all current funding orders remain in place. If the government changes without | ||
| an FSA, all current funding orders will remain in place. If the government changes during | ||
| the FSA, there are insufficient safeguards to ensure the funding promised in the FSA will be | ||
| delivered. An order is easier to enforce than an agreement with the government. | ||
| Protecting Future Generations | F | The Tribunal can make legal orders to stop and prevent the recurrence of discrimination |
| that don’t expire. The draft FSA expires after 10 years and provides inadequate protections | ||
| against Canada reverting to its discriminatory conduct beyond year 10. After the FSA expires, | ||
| there is little clarity that First Nations children have adequate, sufficient, and enforceable | ||
| safeguards to ensure Canada does not discriminate against them again. | ||
| Funding Level | D | We don’t know how the $47.823 billion will be allocated. There is no breakdown by the |
| recipient, calculation methods, or supporting evidence. There are significant commitments | ||
| to fund the Assembly of First Nations (AFN), the Chiefs of Ontario and Nishnawbe Aski Nation | ||
| for their ongoing engagement, as well as funding to support multiple committees and a | ||
| fully staffed Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Tribunal. It is unclear how much of the | ||
| $47.823 billion will directly support and protect First Nations children and youth. The Institute | ||
| of Fiscal Studies and Democracy (IFSD) projects a $10 billion loss in agency funding over five | ||
| years, amounting to $20 billion over 10 years. | ||
First Nations Child & Family Caring Society 350 Sparks Street, Suite 202, Ottawa ON K1R 7S8 | 613 230 5885 | info@fncaringsociety.com | fncaringsociety.com
| Draft FSA | Grade | Comment |
| Funding Structure | D | There are significant departures from the First Nations–informed IFSD research. Contrary |
| to 40/2022, regional experts did not inform the funding structure and the National Advisory | ||
| Committee did not complete its review. Nothing has been disclosed regarding what this | ||
| means for First Nations/agencies/regions. There are concerns that the funding structure | ||
| is entrenching aspects of Canada’s discrimination that the Tribunal identified by diverting | ||
| prevention funding away from agencies, ultimately resulting in their inability to deliver | ||
| prevention as required under Bill C‑92. | ||
| FSA Governance/UNDRIP | F | Canada failed to consult with First Nations as required by United Nations Declaration on the |
| Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and abide by AFN Resolution 40/2022 directing the | ||
| Parties to develop options for long-term reform. Under the draft FSA, First Nations leadership | ||
| cede governance of the overall agreement (including funding levels) to a confidential process | ||
| without representation from all regions. | ||
| Alternative Dispute Resolution | D | The process fails to take a human rights approach to resolving disputes, resulting in significant |
| (Parties Disputes) | deference to Canada regarding issues of compliance and ignores the power imbalance given | |
| that Canada is the perpetrator of discrimination. Furthermore, the ADR cannot compel Canada | ||
| to take specific corrective or remedial actions in cases of non-compliance, nor does it allow for | ||
| punitive measures against Canada. | ||
| Alternative Dispute Resolution | D | The process does not provide First Nations claimants with the same level of protection |
| (Claimants Disputes) | and remedies available under the Canadian Human Rights Act including systemic remedies | |
| even if Canada’s conduct harms multiple children or Nations. Claimants are not entitled to | ||
| compensation for discrimination even if it is wilful and reckless. The process is not child- | ||
| centered, or in accordance with the best interests of the child and Article 12 of the United | ||
| Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Critically, the draft FSA does not include a | ||
| process to fast-track urgent cases when Canada’s conduct might harm a child. | ||
| Internal First Nations | D | Canada has new powers over First Nations and agencies and approval of First Nations and |
| Governance | agency work plans. | |
| Principles | C+ | The principles include some good definitions. However, it defines “First Nations child” per the |
| Indian Act. | ||
| Consistency with AFN Resolution | C | Includes some provisions but did not return with options or ensure that regional experts |
| 2022/40 | or the NAC informed the draft FSA. There are alternatives to the draft FSA (and supporting | |
| materials) that could have been presented and have not been presented to leadership, | ||
| despite this requirement. | ||
IHT5
